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INTRODUCTION: BOARDROOM DRAMA AT HEWLETT-PACKARD

On January 24, 2005, the Wall Street Journalpublished a front-page
article detailing confidential boardroom discussions at Hewlett-Packard's
(H-P) annual board meeting.' The article described, in explicit detail,
discussions about granting three named senior executives more authority
over day-to-day operations of the company despite objections by Carly
Fiorina, H-P's then-chairwoman and chief executive.2 After the Wall Street
Journal article caused rumors of management reorganization, the board
fired Ms. Fiorina in February 2005.' In May 2005, newly appointed
chairwoman Patricia Dunn launched an investigation to determine who
leaked information from H-P's January 2005 board meeting.4 This
investigation failed to identify the source of the leak.'
In January 2006, C-NET published an article detailing long-term
strategy discussions from the H-P board's annual retreat.6 Although the
article revealed mostly positive information,7 Dunn remained concerned
about director leaks to the press.' Dunn hired outside investigators who
tailed suspected leakers and used pretexting9 to obtain private phone

1. Pui-Wing Tam, Hewlett-PackardBoard Considers a Reorganization-Management
Moves Stem from Performance Concerns;HelpingFiorina 'Succeed,' WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,2005,
at Al.
2. Id. According to the article, Fiorina initially resisted the moves but later acquiesced. Id.
3. See Pui-Wing Tam, H-P'sBoard Ousts Fiorinaas CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at
Al.
4. Patricia Dunn, Opinion, The H-P Investigation,WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, at A14.
5. Id.
6. David A. Kaplan, Suspicions andSpies in Silicon Valley, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18,2006, at
40, availableat 2006 WLNR 15902182; Dawn Kawamoto & Tom Krazit, HP OutlinesLong-Term
Strategy, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 23,2006, http://news.com.com/HP+outlines+long-term+strategy/
2100-1014 3-6029519.html.
7. Justin Fox, BoardGames: Leaks, Spies, and Governance,FORTUNE, Oct. 2,2006, at 23,
availableat 2006 WLNR 16198424 (noting that the January 2006 leak was "neither embarrassing
nor very revealing").
8. See Patricia Dunn, supranote 4.
9. Pretexting is a spying technique for obtaining phone records, credit card records, and
other personal information about an individual or company. See Pui-Wing Tam, I Spy--A
Reporter'sStory: How H-PKept Tabs on Mefor a Year, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at Al. In the
H-P case, investigators impersonated Mrs. Tam (a Wall Street Journalreporter covering H-P) in
calls to her phone carrier. Id. The investigators used the last four digits of her social security
number to obtain her phone records. Id. Corporate snooping is hardly limited to H-P. See Michael
Orey, CorporateSnoops, Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 2006, at 47, available at 2006 WLNR 17243485
("Several prominent Hollywood bigwigs and attorneys used the services of... [a] private
investigator... indicted... in February for illegal wiretapping. And Oracle Corp. acknowledged
in 2000 that it hired detectives who had attempted to obtain the trash of a think tank that defended
the aggressive business practices of its archrival, Microsoft Corp."); see also Chistopher Conkey,
FTC Tries to Fight Phone Pretexting but Has Few Weapons, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2006, at BI
(outlining the Federal Trade Commission's struggle to fight pretexting without federal laws
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records of directors and of newspaper reporters covering H-P.10 Dunn
clearly believed the leaks were damaging the corporation, no matter their
content.1 1
Before accepting a position on the board, H-P directors sign
agreements stating that they will not grant unauthorized interviews, 2 but
many directors are not bound by confidentiality agreements. 3
specifically banning the practice). Despite media criticism and the dubious legality of pretexting
and other investigative tactics, the private investigation industry remains strong. See id. (stating that
the "diffuse, opaque nature of the often unregulated information-trafficking industry" limits
regulators' capabilities, and that customers continue to demand private records). However, the
indictment of Patricia Dunn and others involved in the H-P pretexting scandal may chill demand
for private investigators. See Peter Waldman & Don Clark, CaliforniaChargesDunn, 4 Others In
H-PScandal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at Al. The charges against Dunn were eventually dropped.
See Peter Waldman & Christopher Lawton, H-PCase Fizzles in State Court, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2007, at A3; Editorial, Dunn & Lockyer, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2007, at A16 (congratulating
"California Judge Ray Cunningham for showing both mercy and wisdom by dropping all charges
against Patricia Dunn"). The House of Representatives also held hearings to discuss the legality of
pretexting. See generally U.S. Rep. Edward Whitfield (R-KY) Holds a Hearing on the HewlettPackardPretextingScandal:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightand Investigationsofthe
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter House Hearing].
10. See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 40.
11. Patricia Dunn disclosed her personal views in a letter to the Wall Street Journal.See
Patricia Dunn, supra note 4. She stated:
The most sensitive aspects of a company's business come before its board:
strategy, executive succession, acquisitions, new product development. This is
exactly the type of information a company's competitors and those who trade in
its stock would love to have before that information is properly disseminated. This
is exactly why it is so essential that directors respect the confidentiality of the
discussions and decisions that occur in the boardroom.
Id.; see also House Hearing,supra note 9, at 31-32 (opening statement of Patricia Dunn, ExChairman of the Board of Hewlett-Packard, Inc.). Dunn is not alone in her stance. In a recent New
York Times article, George J. Terwilliger III, a former attorney general and current corporate
defense lawyer in Washington D.C., stated, "The boardroom is supposed to be a place where the
people who have a fiduciary duty to manage the company can discuss things amongst themselves,
including performance issues with the management of the company, in the utmost of confidence
that there will not be public disclosure and maneuvering." Julie Creswell, A Board in Need of an
Emily Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 15481039.
12. Patricia Dunn, supra note 4. "At H-P, all directors, officers and employees are bound by
the same Standards of Business Conduct, to which they attest compliance annually, including a
section which says, 'You may not grant interviews or provide comments to the press without prior
approval from H-P Corporate Communications .... ' Id.
13. Corporate leaks provide one reason for the increased use of corporate snoops. According
to a Merrill Lynch survey, more than half of fifty executives surveyed stated that leaks of
confidential or proprietary information were their primary "information-security concern." Phred
Dvorak & Vauhini Vara, At Many Companies,Hunt for Leakers Expands Arsenal of Monitoring
Tactics, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2006, at B 1.Though more infrequent than employee leaks, director
leaks are still a problem at many companies. Id.
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Accordingly, the H-P leaker, later identified as George Keyworth, 4 might
have violated his contractual duties to H-P by granting personal interviews
to reporters.' 5 But is Keyworth liable to H-P shareholders for breaching his
state-law fiduciary duties to the company? 6 Surprisingly, the answer
appears to be no; directors currently do not owe their corporations a
general fiduciary duty of confidentiality. 7
Part 11 of this Note describes recent changes to the legal landscape in
corporate governance. Part Il outlines a director's fiduciary duties under
current Delaware law. Part IV describes how a general duty of
confidentiality would fit squarely within a director's duty of good faith.
Finally, Part V analyzes the implications of recognizing a general duty of
confidentiality before concluding that such a duty would benefit
shareholders, directors, and investors.

[B]oardroom leaks can be a symptom of larger problems. "The leaks are because
someone feels disempowered" on the board .... You can make a rule 'You can't
leak to the press.' But if you don't have a constructive process for people to feel
heard and then commit to decisions, then you've left the door wide open" for
problems.
Id. (quoting Dell Larcen, a management consultant).
14. George Anders & Alan Murray, Boardroom Duel: Behind H-P Chairman's Fall, Clash
with a Powerful Director,WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at Al.
15. See Patricia Dunn, supra note 4.
16. H-P's use of pretexting in its leak investigations led to both criminal and civil charges
against H-P and H-P executives involved in the investigations. See supra note 9. H-P paid $14.5
million to settle a California civil complaint stemming from the company's use of pretexting in its
investigations. See Christopher Lawton, H-P Settles Civil Charges in 'Pretexting'Scandal,WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A3. The pretexting issue is outside the scope of this Note, which focuses on
directors' duty of confidentiality.
17. Research revealed no caselaw outside the insider-trading realm addressing whether a
director who reveals corporate confidences fails to act in good faith. Compare COMMrrTEE ON
CORPORATE LAWS, AM. BAR Ass'N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 18-19 (4th ed. 2004)
[hereinafterDIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK] ("A director should keep confidential all matters involving
the corporation that have not been disclosed to the general public."), with Viet D. Dinh, Dunn and
Dusted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A14 ("[T]here is no general duty of confidentiality for
directors, only a duty of loyalty to act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.").
Despite its recommendation, the Director's Guidebook explicitly states that "[i]ts description of
director conduct is not intended as legal advice or a suggestion that different conduct will result in
violation of the law or potential personal liability." DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supra, at 2.
Accordingly, the Director's Guidebook is best understood as an outline of "best practices" as
opposed to minimum practices to avoid liability. It should also be noted that Mr. Dinh represents
Tom Perkins, another H-P director and close friend of George Keyworth. See Anders & Murray,
supranote 14 ("When the leak issue came to a head, Mr. Perkins tried to play down the matter and
protect his friend, Mr. Keyworth, who was fingered as the leaker.").
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11. RECENT CHANGES IN THE CORPORATE CLIMATE

Recent corporate scandals have greatly influenced the field of corporate
governance. Increased media attention since the corporate scandals at
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom"8 has caused courts to express less deference
toward directors' business judgment 9 and to hold directors accountable to
higher standards of conduct.2 ° As a trendsetter in corporate law, the
Delaware judiciary has heightened standards for director conduct through
the developing duty of good faith.2
23
In the past, the business judgment rule22 and director shield statutes
effectively eliminated director liability for all but the most egregious
conduct.24 In support of director shield statutes, commentators argue that
the risk of liability prevents otherwise willing candidates from accepting
directorships. 25 The recent corporate scandals have brought corporate
18. See CG Hintmann, Comment, You Gotta Have Faith: Good Faith in the Context of
DirectorialFiduciaryDuties and the FutureImpact on CorporateCulture, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J.
571, 571 (2005) ("Everyone remembers the highly publicized financial scandals involving
WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron, which ultimately cost shareholders $460
billion.").
19. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Good FaithBusiness Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
CorporateLaw Jurisprudence,55 DuKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (describing how the corporate scandals
of the early 2000s have forced courts to express less deference toward a director's business
judgment).
20. See Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are
Delaware Courts Ready to Force CorporateDirectorsto Go Out-of-Pocket After Disney IV?, 83
DENY. U. L. REV. 531, 536 (2005) (describing how Delaware courts are increasing the standards
required of directors by providing "specific instructions to help plaintiffs overcome procedural
obstacles and substantive explanations of what a breach of good faith might look like").
21. This Note focuses on Delaware state law because the Delaware judiciary is a trendsetter
in corporate law and because H-P is incorporated in Delaware. See Hewlett-Packard Co., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Dec. 22, 2006). Many commentators have written about the Delaware
courts' increased recognition of the duty of good faith. See generally Tara L. Dunn, supra note 20
(discussing how the duty of good faith exposes corporate directors to personal liability); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Duty of GoodFaithin CorporateLaw, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (outlining the
development of the duty of good faith in Delaware law); Thomas Rivers, Note, How to Be Good:
The Emphasis on CorporateDirectors'Good Faithin the Post-EnronEra, 58 VAND. L. REV. 631
(2005) (describing good faith as another procedural device courts can use to hold directors
personally liable); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004)
(distinguishing between the duty of good faith and the duties of care and loyalty).
22. See infra note 37.
23. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of theDirector'sDuty of Care:JudicialAvoidance
of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591 (1983)
(asserting, shortly before the Delaware Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
that courts' overly broad interpretations of the business judgment rule had rendered the fiduciary
duty of care meaningless); see also infra notes 30-31.
25. See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Eliminationor Limitation ofDirectorLiability
forDelawareCorporations,12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 8 (1987); Nanette Byrnes & Jane Sasseen, Board
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governance to the forefront, however, and the states have increased their
supervision of director conduct. 6 In addition, the federal government has
begun intruding more into the field of corporate governance with the
passage of both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200227 and Regulation Fair
Disclosure. 8
Further, judges are increasingly scrutinizing director decisions and
showing a higher propensity to impose personal liability on directors who
breach their fiduciary duties. 29 The willingness of directors at Enron and
WorldCom to pay out-of-pocket class action settlements of $13 million
and $25 million, respectively," exemplifies the current trend toward
increased scrutiny of directors since the recent wave of corporate scandals.
This shift directly contrasts with courts' previous reluctance to impose

of HardKnocks, Bus. WK., Jan. 22,2007, at 36,38, availableat 2007 WLNR 1239482 (noting that
"[a]ctivist shareholders, tougher rules, and anger over CEO pay have put directors on the hot seat,"
and that "[m]any board candidates no longer find the job attractive"). But see Lisa M. Fairfax,
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?RevitalizingDirectors'FiduciaryDuty ThroughLegalLiability,
42 Hous. L. REv. 393,449-55 (2005) (asserting that no proof exists that increased director liability
will lead to "wholesale desertion of corporate directorships").
26. Tara L. Dunn, supra note 20, at 541 (describing how the Delaware courts have
incrementally increased standards for director conduct while working within the constraints of
precedent and stare decisis).
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
28. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2006). The Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002
and Regulation FD represent two instances of federal intrusion into areas of law typically reserved
to the states. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of CorporateGovernance,30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 79 (2005) (analyzing the increased role of federal law in corporate governance after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); infra note 156.
29. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally
liable for gross negligence in approving a merger); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that directors must assure reporting and information systems
exist to provide sufficient information to reach informed judgments). See generally Tara L. Dunn,
supra note 20 (arguing that institutional plaintiffs have enough power and sophistication to use the
duty of good faith to circumvent director liability shields and force directors to pay damages out-ofpocket). But see generally Griffith, supranote 19 (arguing that the appearance of the duty of good
faith since the recent corporate scandals is part of an oscillating pattern of judicial oversight in
direct response to public pressure and media attention).
30. See Bernard Black et. al., OutsideDirectorLiability,58 STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1118 (2006).
Despite these large settlements against Enron and WorldCom directors, some commentators argue
that outside directors still face relatively low exposure to out-of-pocket liability as long as they have
appropriate insurance policies and standard indemnification agreements with the corporation. Id.
at 1137-39. For an alternative view, see Tara L. Dunn, supra note 20, at 533-34 (arguing that
directors face a "very real possibility of personal liability" due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
increasingly aggressive and sophisticated institutional investors, and more refinedjudicial standards
for director conduct pursuant to the duty of good faith).
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personal liability on directors.3 '
Since Enron and WorldCom, the corporate legal landscape has changed
dramatically. Media coverage and public outrage have changed social
norms and expectations for director behavior. As courts respond to the
media attention given to the recent corporate scandals, the duty of good
faith has evolved as an appropriate way to proscribe culpable director
conduct otherwise permitted by the traditional duties of care and loyalty.32
By emphasizing the duty of good faith, courts allow shareholder-plaintiffs
to avoid director exculpatory and indemnification provisions,33 therefore
increasing the likelihood that directors will be held personally liable for
breaches of their fiduciary duties.

11.

DIRECTOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES PURSUANT TO DELAWARE LAW

Pursuant to Delaware law, "the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation are managed by or under its board of directors."34 In
performing his managerial duties, a director is "charged with an unyielding
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders., 35 When
shareholders attempt to challenge director conduct in a derivative action,
a court "presumes that 'in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation act[] on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest36
belief that the action taken [i]s in the best interests of the company.'

31. See Black et al., supra note 30, at 1067 (stating that Van Gorkom was the only case in
which a court forced outside directors to pay out-of-pocket damages to shareholder-plaintiffs);
Cohn, supranote 24, at 638 (noting that the business judgment rule had become an insurmountable
barrier to imposing liability on culpable directors); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 411 (noting that Van
Gorkom is "the exception that proves the rule" that directors face little risk of out-of-pocket
liability).
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
34. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006); FLA.
STAT. § 607.0801(2) (2006). The statute states,
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such
provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties
conferred or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised
or performed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in
the certificate of incorporation.
Id.
35. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
36. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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This presumption, known as the business judgment rule,37 can be rebutted
if a plaintiff shows that a director breached any of his fiduciary duties of
loyalty, care, or good faith.3" If a plaintiff proves that a director breached
a fiduciary duty, the breaching director must either prove that the
challenged act or transaction is entirely fair to the corporation and its
shareholders or pay damages caused by the breach.39 The remainder of Part
III outlines the three duties that a director owes to his corporation and its
shareholders: loyalty, care, and good faith.40
A. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires a director to act in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.4 When evaluating

37. Under the business judgment rule, a court presumes that directors who are not financially
interested in a transaction act on an informed basis and reasonably believe that their actions are in
the best interests of the corporation. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30
(2004) (defining "Standards of Conduct for Directors"); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (c) (2005). Courts justify this deference to director judgment by asserting that
shareholders voluntarily invest in risky businesses for profit and that "after-the-fact litigation is a
most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 88586 (2d Cir. 1982). For an analysis of the business judgment rule as applied to corporate officers,
see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, CorporateOfficers and the Business JudgmentRule, 60 Bus. LAW. 439
(2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule "does not and should not be extended to corporate
officers in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors").
38. Disney,906 A.2d at 52. Commentators and judges dispute whether the duty of good faith
is a separate fiduciary duty or is included within the duties of loyalty and care. See Eisenberg, supra
note 21, at 10-15 (outlining the conflict between the Delaware Supreme Court's "triadic" view of
director fiduciary duties and the "dyadic" view expressed by Vice Chancellor Strine of the
Delaware Court of Chancery); see also, MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2004) (defining standards
of liability for improper director conduct). In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), the
Delaware Supreme Court adopted the dyadic view, stating that "the requirement to act in good faith
'is a subsidiary element,' i.e., a condition, 'of the fundamental duty of loyalty."' Id. at 370 (quoting
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
39. Disney, 906 A.2d at 52. But see Cohn, supra note 24, at 594-95 ("So common is the
disposition of cases by reference to the business judgment rule that a casual observer could readily
conclude that the obligation of care and the defensive presumption of the business judgment rule
are mirror images of a unitary standard. It is doubtful whether there still exists a sanction for lack
of care, unadulterated by self-enrichment or other opprobrious behavior." (footnote omitted)).
40. In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that "although good faith may be described
colloquially as part of a 'triad' of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty,
... [o]nly the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to
act in good faith may do so, but indirectly." Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. This Note refers to the duty
of good faith in this "colloquial" sense.
41. This Note is principally concerned with the duty of good faith. For detailed analyses of
the duty of care, see Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Componentof the DelawareBusiness
Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971 (1994) (outlining former Delaware Supreme Court Justice
Horsey's views concerning the interplay between the duty of care and the business judgment rule);
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duty of care claims, courts generally focus on the process directors use to
reach corporate decisions.42 Thus, duty of care claims typically concern a
director's obligations to monitor corporate actions 43 and to act only after
reasonable investigation and consideration." Although the duty of care
imposes hefty obligations, directors generally face liability only if they act
in a grossly negligent manner.45 Additionally, directors enjoy substantial
statutory protection from liability for breaches of the duty of care. Director
shield46 and indemnification 41 statutes allow a corporation to limit or
eliminate director personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. As48a
result, courts almost never impose liability for these types of breaches.

Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787 (1999)
(critiquing judicial standards of review in duty-of-care cases).
42. See JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATION 203-04 (2d Ed. 2003).
43. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("1 am of
the view that a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that
failure to do so under some circumstances may... render a director liable for losses caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards."). But see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929,
943 (Del. 1985) (noting that directors "cannot be expected to manage the day-to-day activities of
a company").
44. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors personally liable
for failing "to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant to
their decision to recommend" a merger).
45. See id. at 881 (concluding that directors' gross negligence in approving a merger
breached their duty of care).
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2006).
Pursuant to Delaware's statute, the certificate of incorporation of a corporation may contain the
following:
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) [for any unlawful
dividend payment or stock purchase]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). For cases outlining the protections of Delaware's exculpation statute, see
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999); Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp,
Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1286-89 (Del. 1994). For the American Law Institute's version of the
exculpatory statute, see A.L.I., supra note 37, § 7.19.
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 607.0850 (2006); see also MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51 (2004).
48. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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B. The Duty of Loyalty

In contrast to the duty of care, which focuses on a director's decisionmaking process, the duty of loyalty generally focuses on a director's
motives.4 9 The duty of loyalty requires a director to prioritize corporate
interests ahead of the director's personal interests.50 "Simply put, a director
should not use the director's corporate position for personal profit or gain
or for other personal or non-corporate advantage." 5 ' Thus, a loyalty
concern typically arises when a director either has a financial conflict of
interest with the corporation52 or usurps a corporate opportunity.53
The Delaware Supreme Court expanded the scope of the duty of
loyalty, however, in its recent decision in Stone v. Ritter. 4 Amid the
Delaware courts' recent focus on the duty of good faith (discussed more

49. See Cox & HAZEN, supra note 42, at 204.
50. DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supranote 17, at 14. This Note principally concerns the good
faith aspect of the duty of loyalty. For further analysis of the general duty of loyalty, see Lyman

Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27
(2003) (describing changes in the duty of loyalty since the scandal at Enron).
51. DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 14.

52. See Eisenberg, supranote 21, at 27-28 ("A manager is interested, for purposes of the duty
of loyalty, when he, an associate, or a family member has a financial interest in the transaction or
the conduct."). Thus, director conflict-of-interest issues generally arise when a director acts on both
sides of a transaction or fails to disclose a direct or indirect financial interest in a corporate
transaction. Perlegos v. Atmel Corp., Nos. Civ. A. 2320-N, Civ. A. 2321-N 2007 WL 475453, at
*16 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2007) ("The facts differ from case to case, but the question of directors'
loyalty almost universally centers on whether they were interested or laced the independence
relative to the matter before them."); DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 15; see also Nagy
v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 47 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding directors liable for failing to inform a
minority shareholder that the directors served on both sides of a merger agreement).
53. The corporate opportunity doctrine originated with the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). The court stated,
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public
policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of
human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a
corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which
his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest.
Id. at 510.
54. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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fully below), courts and scholars disagreed whether the duty of good faith
was a separate fiduciary duty or simply an element of the duty of loyalty."
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court resolved this conflict by holding
that the5 6duty of good faith was a "subsidiary element" of the duty of
loyalty.

When a loyalty concern arises, a court will evaluate the act or
transaction under the "entire fairness" standard.57 Under this standard, the
transaction must be substantively fair and must affirmatively benefit the
corporation.58 If a court deems the questioned transaction fair to the
corporation, the transaction is valid and the director has not breached his
duty of loyalty. 9

55. CompareEisenberg, supra note 21, at 27-31 (distinguishing the duty of good faith from
the traditional duties of care and loyalty), and Sale, supra note 21, at 464 (arguing that the courts
have "laid the groundwork" for a freestanding duty of good faith), with Guttman v. Huang, 823
A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless
she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's best interest."), and Nagy
v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("By definition, a director cannot simultaneously
act in bad faith and loyally towards the corporation and its stockholders.").
56. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (noting that one doctrinal consequence of its formulation of the
obligation to act in good faith was that "the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. [The duty of loyalty] also
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.").
57. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995). The fairness
standard is extremely fact-specific. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405-06 (Del. 1987)
(analyzing detailed facts surrounding loans made by directors to the corporation). Relevant factors
a court might consider include the following:
(i) whether the terms of the proposed transaction are at least as favorable to the
corporation as might be available from other persons or entities, (ii) whether the
proposed transaction is reasonably likely to further the corporation's business
activities and (iii) whether the process by which the decision is approved or
ratified is fair.
supra note 17, at 16.
58. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 41.
59. Id. In the past, transactions involving interested directors were voidable upon proof of
a director conflict of interest. See Marciano, 535 A.2d at 403. Under current law, however, an
interested-director transaction is voidable only if the transaction is unfair to the corporation. See
id. at 404. Ordinarily, an interested director must prove that the transaction is fair to the
corporation. Id. Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, however, shifts the burden
of proof to the plaintiff to prove the unfairness of a transaction if the transaction is approved by a
majority of disinterested directors or shareholders. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d
1134, 1154 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 607.0832 (2006). Section 144 operates only as a "burden switch";
courts will still analyze the intrinsic fairness of a transaction even if the transaction has been
approved by disinterested directors or shareholders. See Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404-05.
DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK,
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C. The Evolving Duty of Good Faith
As a matter of statutory law, most states require directors to discharge
their duties in good faith.6" In Delaware, the duty of good faith is not an
independent fiduciary duty, but a necessary condition to a director's
compliance with his fiduciary duty of loyalty. 61However, the duty of good
faith was typically disregarded by courts in favor of a director's fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care.62 In contrast, the Delaware judiciary has
recently begun using the duty of good faith as a "doctrinal vehicle" to
proscribe questionable director conduct not covered by the traditional
definitions of loyalty and care.63
In In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation,' the Delaware
Supreme Court outlined the contours of the evolving duty of good faith.65
The Disney derivative litigation arose from Disney's employment and
subsequent termination of Michael Ovitz as president.66 In August, 1995,
Disney signed a five-year employment agreement with Ovitz.6 7 After
fourteen months of mediocre performance by Ovitz, Disney terminated his
employment without cause, paying him a severance package valued at
approximately $130 million. 68 Disney shareholders sued both Ovitz and
Disney's directors, claiming that the board was grossly negligent in its
cursory review of Ovitz's employment contract and subsequent no-fault

60. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 6-10 (outlining the "legal status" of the duty of good
faith pursuant to statutory law); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2004) ("Each member
of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act . . . in good
faith .... ).
61. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70; supranotes 54-56 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7,
2001).
63. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006)
(stating that the duty of good faith is an appropriate "doctrinal vehicle" to protect a corporation's
interests from fiduciary misconduct that "does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but
is qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence"); see also Berlin, 726 A.2d at 1221 (noting
that "a breach of any one of the board of directors' triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or
due care, sufficiently rebuts the business judgment presumption and permits a challenge to the
board's action under the entire fairness standard"). Vice Chancellor Strine has consistently
criticized the Delaware Supreme Court's formulation of the duty of good faith. See, e.g., Guttman
v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (arguing that the duty of good faith is simply
an element of the duty of loyalty); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("By
definition, a director cannot simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally towards the corporation and
its stockholders.").
64. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
65. Id. at 62-68.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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termination. 69 The shareholders asserted that the directors' gross
negligence breached both their duty of care and, in an attempt to
circumvent Delaware's director shield statute, their duty of good faith.7"
The court of chancery concluded that each Disney director fulfilled his
fiduciary duties,7 ' and the shareholders appealed.72 The Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed and clarified the distinctions between a director's fiduciary
duties of care and good faith.73
The Delaware Supreme Court sharply criticized the Disney
shareholders for trying to "collapse" the duty of good faith into the duty
of care. 74 The court asserted that the shareholders' claims amounted only
to claims of gross negligence-the typical standard for a breach of the duty
of care.75 Although the duties of good faith and care might cross
conceptually when a director is grossly negligent, the court asserted that
the need to draw precise legal lines mandates that grossly negligent
conduct "without any malevolent intent" cannot constitute a breach of the
duty of good faith.76
The Disney court further noted that the Delaware legislature also
supports the distinction between the duties of care and good faith.77 The
Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes Delaware corporations to
exculpate 7 and indemnify79 directors from monetary damages for breaches
of the duty of care but not for violations of the duty of good faith. From
these two legislative actions, the Delaware Supreme Court failed to find
any "basis in policy, precedent or common sense" to justify destroying the
distinction between gross negligence-breach of the duty of care-and
bad faith. 0
To further distinguish the duty of good faith from the duty of care, the
court examined two other categories of director conduct that might breach
the duty of good faith.8 The first category, "subjective bad faith," includes
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id. at 52.
71. Id. at 35.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 62-68.
74. Id. at 63. The court stated that the shareholders' "effort to collapse the duty to act in good
faith into the duty to act with due care[] is not unlike putting a rabbit into the proverbial hat and
then blaming the trial judge for making the insertion." Id.
75. Id. at 53.
76. Id. at 64-65.
77. Id. at 65-66.
78. Id. at 65; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2006) (allowing a corporation
to exculpate directors for a breach of the duty of care except in certain limited circumstances,
notably "for acts or omissions not in good faith").
79. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (2006).
80. Disney, 906 A.2d at 66.
81. See id. at 64-68.
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conduct motivated by intent to harm the corporation.82 Such conduct is
"quintessential bad faith." 3
The second category consists of director conduct between subjective
bad faith and gross negligence.8 4 For this category, the Delaware Supreme
Court agreed with the court of chancery's definition of bad faith:
"[I]ntentional dereliction of duty [or] a conscious disregard for one's
responsibilities. '85 The Delaware Supreme Court noted that the duty of
good faith encompasses conduct that is not disloyal in the classic sense,
but consists of misconduct more culpable than simple inattention or failure
to inform.86
Thus, the court described the duty of good faith as a convenient
"vehicle" for doctrinally addressing misconduct not contained within the
traditional duties of care or loyalty. 87 For examples of possible breaches
of the duty of good faith, the court listed the following: an intentional act
not in the best interest of corporation, an act that violates applicable
positive law, and a conscious disregard of a duty to act. 88 These examples
illustrate that the duty of good faith fills an important doctrinal gap
between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. The duty of good faith
allows courts to sanction director behavior that complies with the
director's traditional duties of loyalty and care but contradicts public
policy. 89 Over time, courts can adapt to changes in policy and corporate
mores by proscribing questionable director conduct under the duty of good
faith. 90

82. Id. at 64.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 67 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-56 (Del.
Ch. 2005)).
89. See id at 66-67. Although a failure to act in good faith alone will not result in the direct
imposition of liability, Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006), such a failure would
likely remove the director from the protection of the business judgment rule, exposing the director's
actions to more critical judicial scrutiny under the entire fairness standard. See supra Part III.B.
90. The duty of good faith is one way for courts to express social norms within the field of
corporate law. However, morality and social norms have always played important roles in corporate
law. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Symposium: CorporateLaw and SocialNorms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1264-87 (1999) (arguing that social norms, not the threat of liability, cause courts to increase
required levels of directorial care); see also Stuart R. Cohn, Corporate Natural Law: The
Dominance ofJustice in a Codified World, 48 FLA. L. REv. 551, 552 (1996) (arguing that courts
resolve "most of the really difficult and interesting corporate law problems by resort to principles
of fairness and equity, rather than statutory or similar positivist standards").
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IV. DIRECTOR LEAKS AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH

This Part argues that director leaks violate the duty of good faith. In
recent years, the Delaware Supreme Court has provided more guidance to
both directors and shareholder-plaintiffs on the duty of good faith. 9' As
discussed above, the duty of good faith proscribes conduct that might not
violate a director's traditionally defined fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care but should be culpable as a matter of public policy.92
The boardroom leaks at H-P demonstrate how a director who leaks
confidential information cannot be acting in good faith.93 Former H-P
chairman Patricia Dunn hired investigators for the sole purpose of
determining the source of boardroom leaks.94 As a result of the 2005
leak,95 the board was forced to fire Carly Fiorina.96 Although the
information leaked for the C-NET article97 in January 2006 was mostly
positive, Dunn knew neither the leaker's motivation nor whether the leaks
would continue. 98 Indeed, if the board failed to address the leaks, the
directors
might expose themselves to liability for breaching their duty of
99
care.

Because the leaker, George Keyworth, received no personal financial
benefit from the leaks, he did not breach his traditional duty of loyalty to

91. See Disney, 906 A.2d at 61-68.
92. See supraPart III.C.
93. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 30-31 (arguing that courts can respond to social changes
by using the duty of good faith to articulate new fiduciary obligations).
94. Patricia Dunn, supra note 4.
95. The 2005 director leak led to an article in the Wall Street Journal.See Tam, supra note 1.
96. See Tam, supra note 3.
97. Kawamoto & Krazit, supra note 6.
98. See Patricia Dunn, supra note 4; see also James B. Stewart, The Kona Files, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 19,2007, at 152, availableat 2007 WLNR 3892177 ("Leaking 'good' information
is as unacceptable as leaking 'bad' information-no one can foretell how such information may
advantage or disadvantage one investor relative to another." (quoting former H-P chairwoman
Patricia Dunn)).
99. In the past, directors had no duty "to install and operate a corporate system of espionage
to ferret out wrongdoing" absent some cause for suspicion. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). However, the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected a broad
interpretation of this rule in In re CaremarkInternationalInc. DerivativeLitigation,698 A.2d 959
(Del. Ch. 1996), which held that a director, to satisfy his obligation to remain reasonably informed,
must assure that "information and reporting systems exist" to provide accurate and timely
information to the board. Id. at 970; see also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822
(N.J. 1981) ("Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because
they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look. The sentinel asleep at his post
contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect." (citation omitted)). If the director
leaks continued to cause problems for H-P and the board failed to act, shareholders might have had
a viable claim against the directors for breach of their duty of care for failing to stop--or at least
investigate-the leaks.
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H-P.' 0 Further, Keyworth likely complied with his duty of care because
he attended board meetings and remained informed about the operations
of the company.'0 ' But, by leaking confidential corporate information,
Keyworth failed to act in good faith. Director leaks, such as Keyworth's,
cannot be in good faith for several reasons. First, boardroom leaks
manipulate and undermine the power of the board of directors. 2 Second,
boardroom leaks expose the corporation and the director to liability for
violating securities laws.'0 3 Finally, boardroom leaks violate general
agency principles." ° For all these reasons, a director who leaks
confidential corporate information to outsiders fails to act in good faith.
A. Boardroom Leaks ManipulateBoardActions
Boardroom leaks cannot be in good faith because these leaks
manipulate 5 boardroom actions. In the cases described below, Delaware
courts held directors liable for breaches of their fiduciary duties for
manipulating board actions in merger situations. These two
cases-resolved before the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the contours
of the duty of good faith in Disney--do not involve leaks of confidential
information, but they exemplify the courts' willingness to consider
manipulative actions in finding directors personally liable for breaches of
their fiduciary duties. Boardroom leaks, like the manipulative actions of
directors in the following two cases, epitomize the type of conduct the
Delaware Supreme Court intends to proscribe through the duty of good
faith. Consequently, a director who leaks confidential corporate
information should face liability for failing to act in good faith.
In the first case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, °6 the Delaware Supreme Court
held directors of a publicly-owned corporation personally liable for
approving a questionable merger in violation of their fiduciary duties.'0 7

100. See Tara L. Dunn, supra note 20, at 543 ("A question of the duty of loyalty arises when
a director has a self-interest in a corporate transaction that is not generally shared by the
corporation's stockholders." (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993))); supra Part III.B.
101. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); supra Part III.A.
102. See infra Part IV.A.
103. See infra Part IV.B.
104. See infra Part IV.C.
105. Pursuant to federal securities laws, "manipulation is 'a term of art' limited to certain types
of transactions specifically designed to artificially affect the price of a security." THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITms REGULATION § 12.1 (5th ed. 2005). This Note uses "manipulate"
in its conventional sense, meaning "to control, manage, or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious
means, [especially] to one's own advantage." WEBSTER' STHIRDNEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1376 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993).
106. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
107. Id. at 893.
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In Van Gorkom, defendant Van Gorkom, the chairman and chief executive
officer of the defendant corporation, sought a leveraged buyout. 10 8 At a
senior management meeting, the company's chief financial officer
presented a "preliminary study" supporting the feasibility of a leveraged
buyout at a price between $50 and $60 per share.' °9 The computations
were a rough estimate however, and the study did not claim to establish a
fair price for the whole company." 0 Van Gorkom vetoed the possibility of
a management buyout at the meeting, "' although he asserted that he would
accept $55 per share for his personal shares in the company." 2
After the meeting, Van Gorkom directed the company's controller to
assess the feasibility of a leveraged buyout at fifty-five dollars per share.",3
Van Gorkom did not consult with any other senior managers or the board
and demanded that the controller keep the analysis strictly confidential." 4
After confirming the feasibility of a sale, Van Gorkom presented the idea
to a "well-known corporate takeover specialist" who offered to buy the
company at Van Gorkom's proposed $55 price several days later." 5 When
Van Gorkom met with senior management two days after receiving the
offer, management objected strongly to the proposed sale. 16 Despite
management objections, Van Gorkom met with the board immediately
afterward to discuss the offer." 7

108. Id. at 865-66.
109. Id. at 865.
110. Id.
According to [the CFO]: They did not "come up" with a price for the Company.
They merely "ran the numbers" at fifty dollars per share and at sixty dollars per
share with the "rough form" of their cash figures at the time. Their "figures
indicated that $50 would be very easy to do but $60 would be very difficult to do
under those figures." This work did not purport to establish a fair price for either
the Company or 100% of the stock. It was intended to determine the cash flow
needed to service the debt that would "probably" be incurred in a leveraged buyout based on "rough calculations"....
Id.
111. Id. Interestingly, the court specifically questioned Van Gorkom's motive to veto a
management-led buyout, stating, "It is noteworthy in this connection that he was then approaching
65 years of age and mandatory retirement." Id. at 866. Presumably, Van Gorkom would prefer a
third-party buyout (as opposed to a management-led buyout) to effect pre-retirement liquidity of
his shares in the company.
112. Id. at 865. Management failed to agree on any buyout plan at this meeting. Id. at 865-66.
113. Id. at 866.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 866-67.
116. Id. at 867.
117. Id. at 868.
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Van Gorkom presented the proposed sale to the board in a twentyminute oral presentation; however, Van Gorkom failed to furnish the board
with copies of the proposed merger agreement before the meeting and
disclosed neither the fact that he initially proposed the $55 price nor how
he arrived at that price." 8 The directors approved the merger at the
meeting, which lasted less than two hours." 9 The shareholders of the
defendant corporation sued the company's directors, alleging that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving the merger. 20 The
Court of Chancery ruled for the director-defendants, asserting that the
directors were entitled to the presumptive protections of the business
judgment rule.' 2 '
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that the directors failed
to reach an informed business decision about the merger.'22 Indeed, by
relying solely on a twenty-minute oral presentation by Van Gorkom, who
himself failed to read the merger agreement before the presentation, the
directors neglected to use any business judgment whatsoever.'23 The
directors failed to inform themselves about the intrinsic value of the
company and deliberated the sale for only two hours without questioning
the need for immediate action.'24 Because the directors relied solely on
Van Gorkom's brief oral presentation in making one of the most important
decisions in the corporation's life, the court asserted that the directors were
grossly negligent in approving the sale.'25
The business judgment rule did not protect the directors because their
gross negligence breached the directors' fiduciary duty of care to the
company.'26 In essence, the court required the directors to use business
judgment'27 before benefiting from the protection of the business judgment
rule.128 Accordingly, the court held the directors personally liable and
remanded the case to the court of chancery to compute the shareholders'
damages.129
118. Id.
119. Id. at 869.
120. Id. at 863, 871.
121. Id. at 864; see also supra note 37 (describing the business judgment rule).
122. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
123. Id. at 874.
124. Id. The potential buyer imposed a three-day window to approve the merger. Id. at 867.
But, no board member questioned the need for immediate action despite the fact that the board was
being asked to act without full information. See id.
125. Id. at 874.
126. Id. at 893.
127. Id. at 874.
128. Id. at 893.
129. See id. In response to Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature amended the Delaware
General Corporation law to allow a corporation, in its charter, to exculpate its directors from
liability for any breach of their duty of care. See Sale, supra note 21, at 458 (stating that the
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Though imposing liability based on the duty of care, the Delaware
Supreme Court strongly criticized Van Gorkom's unilateral actions in
pushing for the sale throughout its opinion. Van Gorkom manipulated the
board both by concealing how he arrived at the proposed price and by
failing to furnish copies of the merger agreement to his fellow directors. 3 '
Van Gorkom also vetoed other potentially more lucrative buyout offers
and adopted amendments to the merger agreement without conferring with
the board. 3 ' In fact, Van Gorkom even failed to read the final merger
agreement before executing it. 132 By strongly criticizing Van Gorkom's
conduct, the court indicated its willingness to hold directors personally
liable for manipulative boardroom behavior.
In the second case, Nagy v. Bistricer,33 the court imposed personal
liability on directors for coercively executing a merger over objections
from a minority shareholder. 34 In Nagy, two defendants owned 85% and
served as the only two directors of Riblet Products Corporation (Riblet). 31
The plaintiff owned the other 15% of Riblet.' 36 The two directors merged
Riblet with Coleman Cable Acquisition, Inc. (Coleman), another
corporation majority-owned and controlled by the two directordefendants. 137 Pursuant to the merger agreement, which was signed by the
director-defendants on behalf of both corporations, Riblet shareholders
would receive a tentatively set amount of Coleman shares in exchange for
their shares in Riblet 38 However, this exchange rate could be adjusted
Delaware legislature responded to Van Gorkom "by abdicating part of its role in regulating
corporate governance and adopting the now ubiquitous exculpatory statute that allows companies,
at the directors' initiative, to exempt themselves from damages for failing to adhere to their duty
of care"); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
130. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874, 877 n.19.
131. Id. at 884-85. The Delaware Supreme Court mentioned two potentially more lucrative
offers. The first, solicited by the defendant-corporation's senior management, offered $60 per share
under terms and conditions substantially the same as the sale solicited by Van Gorkom. Id. at 884.
"Van Gorkom's reaction to the [alternative] proposal was completely negative." Id. Van Gorkom
refused to issue a press release announcing the offer and never presented the offer to the board. Id.
at 885. As a second alternative, the potential buyer was prepared to offer between $2 and $5 more
per share than the merger that the directors approved. Id. The second alternative, however, never
materialized into a full offer because of the impending "deadline" imposed by the original merger
agreement. Id.
132. Id. at 869.
133. 770 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2000).
134. Id. at64.
135. Id. at46.
136. Id. The plaintiff had a history of problems with the defendant-directors. Id. The plaintiff
served as Riblet's chief executive officer for fifteen years before Riblet's two directors terminated
his employment. Id. at 47. The plaintiff sued the directors and was awarded compensatory damages
of more than $1 million for breach of his employment contract. Id.
137. Id. at 46-47.
138. Id. at46.
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upon the advice of an
upward or downward by the Coleman 3board,
9
investment banker selected by Coleman. 1
Under the merger agreement, the plaintiffs sole remedy was to seek
appraisal of his shares. 4 ° However, the directors notified the plaintiff of
the merger only after the merger was consummated, and the appraisal
demand was due before the Coleman board determined the final
consideration for the merger.' 4 ' The documents the directors sent to advise
the plaintiff of his rights contained no financial information about either
Riblet or Coleman, no discussion of how the merger was negotiated, and
no reasons why the Riblet board agreed to the merger.'42
The plaintiff sued the two directors and Riblet, arguing that the
directors breached their fiduciary duties by abdicating the final decision
on the merger consideration to the Coleman board. 41 3The court agreed and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.'" By abdicating their duty to
negotiate a fair price for the merger, the directors breached their duty of
loyalty to the plaintiff as a Riblet shareholder. "
Furthermore, the court found particularly persuasive the plaintiffs
argument that the directors structured the merger in an "inequitably
coercive" manner.'46 The directors failed to provide to the plaintiff any
financial information about either company, and denied the plaintiff any
knowledge of the final merger consideration.'47 Accordingly, the directors
"exerted maximum pressure on [the plaintiff] to exercise the lesser of two
non-optimal options: appraisal."' 48
These two cases demonstrate courts' willingness to hold accountable
manipulative directors. Van Gorkom manipulated his board into approving
a questionable merger, and the director-defendants in Nagy coerced the
plaintiff into seeking appraisal for his shares. Director leaks are just as
damaging and equally manipulative as the behavior in the cases above.
139. Id.
140. Id.Pursuant to Delaware law, a shareholder of a company targeted for merger or
consolidation may demand an appraisal of the fair value of his shares by the Delaware Court of
Chancery. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2006); see also FLA. STAT. § 607.1302 (2006)
(detailing shareholders' appraisal rights pursuant to Florida law).
141. Nagy, 770 A.2d at 47-48.
142. Id. at48.
143. Id.at 48-49.
144. Id.at 65.
145. Id.at 62. Pursuant to Delaware law, the board of directors must approve any merger. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 25 1(b) (2006); see also FLA. STAT. § 607.1101 (2006) (detailing Florida's
requirement that the board of directors approve any merger). Directors must act in an informed and
deliberate manner in approving a merger and may not abdicate this duty to shareholders alone. See
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
146. Nagy, 770 A.2d at 63.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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For example, a director who disagrees with a board strategy to develop
a new product line could leak news of the strategy to the press. Once the
strategy is leaked, the corporation might lose important "first-to-market"
advantages because the director revealed the corporation's strategy to its
competitors. The director's leak could force the corporation to forgo
developing the product line because it has lost its "head start" on the
competition. By leaking news of the new product development to the
press, the director has manipulated the board into reversing course and
rejecting the new product development strategy. In this example, the
director's leak violates the public policies of preventing manipulative
behavior in the boardroom and encouraging the collegiality of board
actions. 4 9 Accordingly, director leaks are manipulative and against public
policy, and should be proscribed under the duty of good faith.
B. DirectorLeaks Violate FederalSecurities Laws
A director who causes his corporation to violate the law fails to act in
good faith. 5 ' Director leaks expose both the director and his corporation
to liability for violating federal securities laws in two situations. First,
corporations have a duty under the securities laws to respond promptly to
market rumors."' Director leaks may render corporate statements
materially misleading, causing the corporation to violate § 10(b).. of the

149. See generally Stewart, supra note 98 (describing former H-P CEO Carly Fiorina's and
former H-P chairwoman Patricia Dunn's views regarding the role of trust and collegiality in the
boardroom). For a response to the New Yorker article by Tom Perkins, who protested the leak
investigations at H-P by resigning from the H-P board, see Tom Perkins, Opinion, The
'Compliance'Board,WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2007, at A11.
150. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 64 n.102
(Del. 2006).
151. See State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) ("A
company has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless those rumors can be
attributed to the company." (citations omitted)).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). The statute provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement... , any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934'53 and Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule 1Ob-5.154 Second, director leaks expose the director to insider
trading liability as a "tipper" of material, non-public information. 55 An
overarching policy of the federal securities laws is to promote investor
confidence through equal access to information. 156 Directors who leak
confidential corporate information undermine this policy and expose
themselves to liability under federal securities laws. As noted above, a

153. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78nn).
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). Rule lOb-5 states,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility or any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.; see also infra Part IV.B. 1.
155. See infra Part IV.B.2.
156. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 n.14 (1988). Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Regulation FD) demonstrates a clear federal policy advocating uniform dissemination of
information to the market. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2006). The statute provides as follows:
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any [broker or
dealer; investment adviser; investment company; or holder of the issuer's
securities], the issuer shall make public disclosure of that information...
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
Id.
The SEC has fined both corporations and individual insiders for violating Regulation FD. In
2003, the SEC settled an enforcement proceeding against Schering-Plough, fining the corporation
$1 million and the company's Chief Executive Officer, Richard Kogan, $50,000. See ScheringPlough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, 81 SEC Docket 54, 2003 WL 22082153, at *8
(Sept. 9,2003) (fining Richard Kogan); SECv. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
18,330, 81 SEC Docket 153, 2003 WL 22082154, at *1 (describing settlement between the SEC
and Schering-Plough). For purposes of the statute, "acting on behalf of an issuer" does not apply
to communications made by directors, officers, agents, or employees who communicate
information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2006).
Thus, although the director leaks discussed in this Note fall outside the scope of Regulation FD,
the statute evidences a clear federal policy favoring uniform dissemination of information to
investors.
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director who violates positive law or causes his corporation to violate
positive law fails to act in corporate good faith.' 7 Thus, by exposing his
corporation to federal securities liability, a director who leaks corporate
information fails to act in good faith.
1. Corporate Duty to Respond to Market Rumors
Rule lOb-5 prohibits a company from making materially misleading
statements.' The Rule does not, however, generally obligate public
corporations to disclose material information5 9 or correct rumors not
directly attributable to the corporation or its agents. 60 Accordingly, a
corporation faced with market rumors may either quell the rumors with
full disclosure or issue a "no comment" statement.161
However, the SEC maintains that a corporation may not issue a "no
comment" statement if the rumors are directly attributable to the
corporation or its agents. 62 In In re Carnation Company,163 the SEC
investigated public statements made by the Carnation Company
(Carnation) in response to rumors that it was in preliminary acquisition
discussions with Nestld S.A. (Nestle).'" Carnation's share price increased
dramatically after the press began reporting market rumors that Carnation
was a takeover candidate. 65 Despite the fact that Carnation and Nestld
were negotiating a buyout by Nestle, Carnation's treasurer released a
statement denying that there were any corporate developments or company
news that "would account for the stock action."'' 66 As negotiations
continued and the rumor mill continued to chum, Carnation's treasurer
stated in another press release that the company knew "of no corporate

157. See Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.
2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-56 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see also supra note 154.
159. Pub. Sch. Teachers' Pension & Ret. Fund v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co. Sec.
Litig.), 381 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 2004) ("'Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading
under Rule 1Ob-5."'(quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988))).
160. Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,288 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The securities laws... do
not require [a] company to police statements made by third parties for inaccuracies, even if the third
party attributes the statement to [the company]."); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156,
163 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that a plaintiff must allege that the company "sufficiently entangled
itself with the analysts' forecasts to render those predictions 'attributable to it').
161. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket 874, 1985 WL
547371, at *5 n.6 (July 8, 1985).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id.
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reason for the recent surge in its stock price."' 67 Further, the treasurer
acknowledged the rumor that Nestl6 planned to acquire Carnation, but
stated, "We are not negotiating with anyone.' 68 Two weeks after the
treasurer's second press release, Carnation and Nestl6 issued a joint press
release announcing that Nestl6 had agreed to purchase Carnation. 6 9
The SEC asserted that the treasurer's comments were materially
misleading in violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule IOb5*70 These provisions "prohibit an issuer from making public statements
that are false or that fail to include material facts necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading."'' The SEC noted that any statement by an issuer triggers
this prohibition. 72 Emphasizing the importance of accurate and complete
disclosure to the integrity of securities markets, the SEC stated that
whenever these antifraud provisions are not met, "'the company and any
person responsible
for the statements may be liable under the federal
173
securities laws."",

The SEC stressed that any public statement concerning rumors or
unusual market activity must be accurate and complete-this includes an
obligation to disclose sufficient information to prevent the statement from
being misleading. 74 In other words, the treasurer's denial that Carnation
was negotiating with anyone was materially misleading. 75 Notably, the
SEC emphasized that a "no comment" response may be appropriate in
some circumstances,
but not when market rumors are "attributable to leaks
176
from the issuer.',
Accordingly, director leaks not only increase the likelihood that a
corporation will make misleading statements resulting in securities laws
violations but also bar a corporation from responding to market rumors
with "no comment." Without the "no comment" response, a corporation
may be forced to prematurely disclose material information such as merger
negotiations or other corporate news. Director leaks limit a corporation's
ability to conceal material information during deal negotiations and injure
the corporation's bargaining position. Thus, a director who leaks
confidential information fails to act in good faith both by increasing the

167. Id. at *3.
168. Id.
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id. at *4 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968)).
172. Id. at *5.
173. Id. (quoting Public Statements by Corporate Representatives, Exchange Act Release No.
20,560, 1984 WL 482557, at *1 (Jan. 13, 1984)).
174. Id.
175. See id
176. Id. at *5 n.6.
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corporation's exposure to securities laws violations and by increasing the
corporation's disclosure obligations in the wake of market rumors.
2. Tipper Liability Pursuant to Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5
Director leaks may also cause the director to violate insider trading
rules. SEC Rule 1Ob-5 prohibits any act that "operate[s] as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security."' 7 7 In the insider trading context, corporate insiders must either
abstain from trading in their company's securities or disclose any material
non-public information before trading."7 '
Two theories have evolved to justify imposition of insider trading
liability under SEC Rule 1Ob-5.' 7 9 The classical theory imposes liability
based on a fiduciary relationship between the insider in possession of
material non-public information and the shareholders with whom the
insider trades.18° This relationship creates a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading to prevent "a corporate insider from taking unfair advantage
of uninformed stockholders."'' Conversely, the misappropriation theory
predicates liability on a breach of a fiduciary relationship between the
insider and the source of the confidential information.8 2 Thus, an insider
deceives his corporation and violates SEC Rule 1Ob-5 by misappropriating
confidential information for securities trading purposes.' 8 3
As a tipper of confidential information, a director who leaks
consciously disregards his duties of confidentiality under the securities
177. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see supra note 154.
178. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
179. See id. (comparing the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading liability
pursuant to SEC Rule 1Ob-5).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 652 (internal alterations omitted) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
228-29 (1980)).
182. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court first sanctioned the misappropriation theory in UnitedStates
v. O'Hagan.In O 'Hagan,the defendant, a partner in a law firm, discovered that his firm had been
hired to represent a company planning to make a tender offer for the common stock of another
company. Id. at 647. Although the defendant performed no work on the representation, he
purchased securities in the target of the tender offer prior to public disclosure of the agreement. Id.
As a result, the defendant "earned" a risk-free profit of more than $4.3 million. Id. at 648. The
defendant was convicted for violating Rule IOb-5, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the convictions, holding that criminal liability under Rule lOb-5 may not be predicated on the
misappropriation theory. Id. at 649. The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the
misappropriation theory "is both consistent with [§ 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5] and with our precedent." Id at 665. For further analysis of the O 'Hagandecision, see
Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: O'Hagan Resolves "Insider"Trading'sMost Vexing Problems,
23 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1 (1998) (cautioning against over-generalizing the O 'Haganholding).
183. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
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laws. A director who consciously disregards this duty of confidentiality
cannot be acting in good faith.
Further, in SEC v. Sargent,'84 the First Circuit Court of Appeals hinted
that a tipper of confidential information may be liable even if the tipper
never trades based on the information and does not personally benefit from
the tip. 85 In Sargent, the defendant and his coworker were the sole
shareholders of a consulting business the two conducted from a one-room
office in the defendant's basement. 86 The coworker was also a director of
Purolator Products Co. (Purolator), a publicly held corporation.187 When
Purolator became the target of a tender offer, the coworker told the
defendant, in confidence, about the negotiations."' Despite not trading
himself, the defendant allegedly told a friend about the tender offer.189 The
friend bought more than twenty thousand Purolator shares, yielding a
profit of $140,000 after public announcement of the tender offer. 9 The
district court granted a directed verdict to the defendant, but the SEC
successfully appealed and obtained a new trial.' 9'
The circuit court ruled that the directed verdict was improper because
a jury could infer that the defendant breached a duty of confidentiality
owed to his coworker and that the defendant tipped his friend "to maintain
a useful networking contact."' 9 2 In dicta, however, the court questioned

whether benefit to a tipper "is a required element of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 liability" under the misappropriation theory.193 The court implied
that a misappropriation followed by a tip "would create a presumption of
section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 liability."' 94

184. 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
185. Id. at 77.
186. Id. at 71.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at72.
190. Id. at 72-73.
191. Id.at 71, 80.
192. Id. at 77.
193. Id. "However, the Court noted under the classical theory of insider trading, an insider
who provides a tip but who does not himself trade will be liable under lob-5 only if he 'will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."' Id. (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662
(1983)).
194. Id. For further analysis of the personal benefit requirement, see David T. Cohen, Note,
Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the PersonalBenefit Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability
Underthe MisappropriationTheory ofInsider Trading,47 B.C. L. REv. 547, 552 (2006) (arguing
that, in lieu of the tipper personal-benefit requirement, "courts should require that (1) the tipper was
at least reckless as to whether he or she would either benefit personally or harm the information
source by tipping, and (2) the tipper was at least reckless as to whether someone in the line of
tippees would use the information to trade").
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If a benefit to the tipper is not required under the misappropriation
theory, tipper-directors expose themselves to a very real threat of insider
trading liability. Under the First Circuit's interpretation of the
misappropriation theory, a tipper is presumptively liable if the tippee
trades based upon the tip.'95 Thus, if Keyworth leaked information to his
press connection, and his connection traded based on the information prior
to publishing it, both Keyworth and the press connection would be
presumptively liable under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1 96 But why should
Keyworth's liability hinge on whether the press connection trades based
on the information prior to publishing the news? Keyworth betrayed his
corporation's fiduciary trust and misappropriated the information whether
or not he personally benefited from tipping the press.' 97 Keyworth's
securities law liability may be limited because if the tippee doesn't trade,
there is no deceit "in connection with" the purchase or sale of security. 98
However, the agency underpinnings of the misappropriation theory are
broader than just the securities laws; a director who leaks confidential
information fails to act in good faith because he "consciously disregards
his responsibility" to keep corporate information in confidence.
C. DirectorLeaks Violate General Agency Principles
Director leaks also violate general agency principles.' 99 Prohibiting
leaks through a "good faith" duty of confidentiality would harmonize a
director's fiduciary duties with the fiduciary duties required by agency law
in other situations.2 °° In the corporate setting, directors serve as fiduciaries

195. See Sargent, 229 F.3d at 77-78.
196. The O'Haganmisappropriation theory is limited to criminal liability. O'Hagan,521 U.S.
at 650 ("We hold . . . that criminal liability under § 10(b) may be predicated on the
misappropriation theory." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)); see also Salovaara v. Jackson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 593, 601 (D.N.J. 1999) (declining to extend the O'Hagan
holding "to a civil case involving a transaction for high yield debt securities"). Therefore, the SEC
may impose criminal liability under the misappropriation theory; however, a private plaintiff may
not recover damages based on the misappropriation theory.
197. Rule lob-5 liability requires that the deception occur "in connection with" the purchase
or sale of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). The duty of good faith is not (and should not
be) so limited.
198. See id.
199. For an analysis of the interaction between agency law and corporate law, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation:Problems of CandorandKnowledge, 71 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1187 (2003).
200. The idea of a board of directors serving as the primary agents for shareholders originates
from medieval town halls and guilds. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The HistoricalandPoliticalOrigins
of the CorporateBoard of Directors,33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89, 146-49 (2004). In guilds and town
hall settings, a subset of the town met and deliberated on issues facing the town and, presumably,
made decisions in the best interest of the town as a whole. Id.
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of both the corporation and its shareholders.2" 1 As fiduciaries, directors
owe fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith to the company's
shareholders.20 2 Similarly, a lawyer, as an agent, owes his clients similar
duties of loyalty,20 3 diligence,20 4 and good faith.20 5 Unlike directors,
however, lawyers currently owe a general duty of confidentiality.2 6 But
why the difference? As fiduciaries, both lawyers and directors are privy to
highly confidential information and are expected to act in the best interests
of their principals.
Currently, a lawyer serving as both corporate counsel and director still
owes a duty of confidentiality to his client, the corporation.2 °7Outside
directors, however, who are privy to the same confidential information but
less equipped than a lawyer to deal with potential conflicts of interest, are
not bound by the same duty of confidentiality. 20 The confidentiality
principles that apply to counsel-directors should also apply to noncounseldirectors. 209 The duty of good faith provides a perfect vehicle to recognize
that directors owe a general duty of confidentiality.
V. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF A GENERAL DUTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY

Corporate boards make some of the most critical strategic decisions in
a corporation's life, including those regarding mergers, executive
succession, and new product development.2 10 Despite the importance of
boardroom confidentiality, leaks continue to be a pressing problem for
corporations.2 1' To solve this leak problem, courts should recognize that

201. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part III; see also Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 3.
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2004) ("Loyalty and independent

judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
204. Id. R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."); see also id. R. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
205. See id. R. 8.4 (describing acts that constitute lawyer misconduct).
206. See id. R. 1.6 (describing "Confidentiality of Information").
207. See Stephen M. Zaloom, Legal Status of the Lawyer-Director: Avoiding Ethical
Misconduct, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 229, 236-38 (2000) (discussing attorney-client privilege
issues arising when a lawyer serves as both director and lawyer for the same corporation); E.
Norman Veasey & Christine T. DiGuglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional
Responsibilitiesofthe Lawyerfor the Corporation,62 Bus. LAW. 1, 15-16 (Nov. 2006) (outlining
special considerations for corporate counsel serving as a director of a client-corporation).
208. See supra note 17.
209. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT, R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2004) ("A fundamental principle
in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the lawyer
must not reveal information relating to the representation.").
2 10. See supra note 11.
211. Dvorak & Vara, supra note 13 (noting that "[I]eaks are both harder to prevent and easier
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a director owes a duty to his corporation to keep corporate information in
confidence. Doctrinally, this duty should be included within the director's
duty of good faith.212 The remainder of this Part analyzes the benefits and
consequences of recognizing a general duty of confidentiality within the
duty of good faith.
A. Positive Effects of a GeneralDuty of Confidentiality
A good faith duty of confidentiality offers several key benefits. First,
a duty of confidentiality would diminish the corporate leak problem
through the threat of personal liability for directors who leak confidential
information. Second, this duty would help to ensure the collegiality of
board action by preventing manipulative, unilateral director actions. Third,
this duty would harmonize the duties of directors with existing agency
principles. Finally, a duty of confidentiality would improve investor
confidence in securities markets by limiting the selective disclosures of
corporate information that might lead to insider trading violations.
The most obvious benefit of a duty of confidentiality is that it would
deter leaks. Because a director who leaks would not be acting in good
faith, the director would not be protected by an exculpatory provision
under Delaware's liability shield statute or an indemnification
agreement."' Without these protections, a director who leaks will face a
significant threat of personal liability for any harm the leak causes to the
corporation. This threat of liability should operate as a strong disincentive
to leak confidential information.214
By limiting director leaks, a general duty of confidentiality would also
ensure the collegiality of board actions. The underlying principle behind
board management is collegiality.215 Boards reach better decisions after
exchanging and discussing ideas.216 However, leaks allow one director to
supplant his own view of a board meeting or corporate problem for that of

to track as information and communication go digital" and quoting a Merrill Lynch survey finding
that more than half of fifty surveyed executives rated leaks of confidential and proprietary
information as their primary "information-security" concern).
212. See supra Part III.C.
213. See supra notes 46-47, 77-80 and accompanying text.
214. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 395 (arguing that "legal liability represents an essential
mechanism for ensuring directors' fidelity to their fiduciary duties and for questioning reform
efforts that do not include such liability"). But see Geraldine Szott Moohr, An EnronLesson: The
Modest Role of CriminalLaw in PreventingCorporateCrime, 55 FLA. L. REv. 937, 973-75 (2003)
(arguing that criminalliability alone is an ineffective method for affecting behavior in a corporate
setting).
215. DAvID A. DREXLERET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAWAND PRACTICE § 13.01 (2006)
("The underlying and overriding policy of Delaware law with respect to exercising the functions
of the board of directors is collegiality.").
216. Id.
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the entire board.217 Once boardroom discussions are leaked to the press, the
board loses options-which may be exactly what the leaker wants.
Under current law, a director may escape liability for leaking damaging
information to the press, provided that he lacks a financial interest in the
transaction-i.e., he is not trading the stock-and that he thinks the leaks
are in the best interest of the corporation. 218 Leaks, however, are almost
never in the best interests of the corporation.2 9 Leaks harm the
competitive position of the company 220 and allow a single director to
preempt actions by the board. In the H-P case, for example, Keyworth's
leaks forced the board to fire chief executive officer Carly Fiorina before
it was ready to act.221
A duty of confidentiality would also harmonize corporate fiduciary
duties with basic agency principles. Corporate directors, like other
222
fiduciaries, should owe their corporations a duty of confidentiality.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
A company's confidential information

.

. .

qualifies as

property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in
violation of a fiduciary duty ... constitutes fraud akin to

embezzlement-the fraudulent appropriation to one's own
use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by
another.223
The time has come for courts to recognize that directors who leak
"embezzle" confidential corporate information. The duty of good faith
provides a perfect vehicle for censuring this "embezzlement" through a
general fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
Finally, a duty of confidentiality would bolster the SEC's efforts to
boost investor confidence in securities markets by limiting selective
disclosures of corporate information. 224 Director leaks are selective

217. See supra Part IV.A.
218. See supra Parts III.B, IV.B.
219. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1987) (asserting that "silence
pending settlement of the price and structure of a deal is beneficial to most investors, most of the
time"). Butsee Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,234-35 (1988) (questioning whether "secrecy
necessarily maximizes shareholder wealth").
220. DIRECTOR'S GuIDEBOOK, supra note 17, at 18.
221. Peter Burrows, Controllingthe Damageat HP,Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 2006, at 40, available
at 2006 WLNR 17243538 (stating that the H-P board fired Fiorina after her spat with the board
"found its way into the press").
222. See supra Part IV.C.
223. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

224. Id.at 658 (stating that an "animating purpose" of the Exchange Act is "to insure honest
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disclosures that can lead to insider trading. If left unchecked, director leaks
could eventually undermine the integrity of securities markets.225 A good
faith duty of confidentiality would help the SEC fight insider trading and
selective disclosures as well as help to instill investors with confidence in
securities markets.
B. PotentialConsequences of a GeneralDuty of Confidentiality
Recognizing a general duty of confidentiality might also have several
negative consequences. First, the duty would expand the scope of directortipper liability pursuant to federal securities laws. This increased liability
exposure might diminish the pool of qualified people willing to serve as
directors. Second, this increased liability exposure might reduce market
efficiency by limiting corporate incentives to disclose insider information.
Finally, a general duty of confidentiality might prevent potential
whistleblowers, out of fear of liability, from exposing harmful corporate
conduct.
The general duty of confidentiality's potential expansion of director
liability for violations of SEC Rule 1Ob-5 could be problematic. Under the
misappropriation theory, the tipper's tip must violate a duty that the tipper
owes to the source of the information.22 6 Because a director does not owe
a general duty of confidentiality under current law, this requirement
typically means that a director must personally benefit or the corporation
must be harmed-in other words, the director must have breached his
traditional duty of loyalty by disclosing the information.227 If a director
owes a general duty of confidentiality, any tip to an outsider would violate
a duty owed to the corporation. This heightened duty could increase the
probability that a director will be held personally liable for breaching his
fiduciary duties. This expansion of liability could diminish the pool of
qualified persons willing to serve as directors for corporations.
On the other hand, other requirements for a SEC Rule lOb-5 violation
will still limit the scope of director-tipper liability. To establish a criminal
violation of SEC Rule IOb-5, the government must still prove both the
materiality element and the willfulness element.228 For the materiality
element, the government must show that the tipped information would

securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence").
225. See id.("Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors
likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated
nonpublic information is unchecked by law.").
226. Id. at 652.
227. See supra Part III.B.
228. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 665-66; Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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actually affect the decision of a potential buyer or seller.22 9 For the
willfulness element, the defendant must realize that he is committing a
wrongful act.23 ° Thus, a duty of confidentiality would not extend liability
to directors who tip trivial information or who tip inadvertently or
negligently. 1 '
To the extent liability is expanded by a duty of confidentiality, this
increased exposure might also reduce market efficiency by diminishing
corporate incentives to disclose important information. A principal
concern of the securities laws is to maintain market efficiency by
encouraging full disclosure.23 2 If a director fails to act in good faith by
leaking information to outsiders, fewer directors will leak information and
the overall amount of information in the market may be reduced. The
securities laws' primary concern, however, is that all investors have equal
access to information, 233 not to maximize the total amount of information
available.2 34 If a company ceases disclosing information, its investors will

229. Elkind,635 F.2d at 166; SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
("The basic test of materiality is whether a reasonableman would attach importance in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question. This, of course, encompasses any fact which in
reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's stock or
securities." (internal citations and alterations omitted)).
230. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
231. One situation in which leaks should arguably be permitted is when necessary to expose
corporate criminal activity. Obviously, a director should still try to prevent any corporate criminal
activity through his normal monitoring role, but as a matter of public policy, directors should not
be punished for exposing corporate crime. See Cohen, supra note 194, at 577-78 (arguing that
tippers should have a defense to insider trading liability for a disclosure made "in a good faith
attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain to cause substantial physical or financial
harm to others"); see also infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
232. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, 33 SEC Docket 874, 1985
WL 547371, at *4 (July 8, 1985) ("The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to
the integrity of the securities markets cannot be overemphasized.").
233. See supra note 156 (discussing the policies behind Regulation FD).
234. An interesting First Amendment issue arises in the context of Regulation FD and the duty
of confidentiality discussed in this Note. A corporation enjoys the same free speech rights as natural
persons. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978). Commentators
have criticized the SEC's Regulation FD as unconstitutional because it limits corporate free speech.
See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling CorporateSpeech: Is Regulation FairDisclosure
Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005) (arguing that Regulation FD is an
unconstitutional burden on corporate free speech). A general duty of confidentiality might raise
some of the same concerns about free speech. However, "the Supreme Court has occasionally
proclaimed, absent much explanation, that the securities markets remain subject to government
regulation without interference from the First Amendment." Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate
Speech, Securities Regulation, andan InstitutionalApproach to the FirstAmendment, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 613, 645, 674 (2006) (arguing that the "institutional approach" to the First
Amendment advocated by Professor Frederick Schauer "provide[s] significant principled grounds
for permitting greater speech regulation, at least when applied in the realm of securities regulation).
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lose confidence and invest elsewhere. Market economics should force
corporations to continue to disclose enough information to satisfy their
shareholders that they are investing wisely.
A general duty of confidentiality might also silence potential
whistleblowers. A director with knowledge of corporate malfeasance
might be unwilling to expose the problem out of fear of liability for
breaching his duty of good faith. This problem could be mitigated,
' The Supreme
however, by a narrow exception for leaks "in good faith."235
Court followed
an analogous approach in the insider trading realm in Dirks
23 6
V. SEC.

The defendant in Dirks, who worked as a securities analyst, received
tips from employees of Equity Funding of America that the company
fraudulently overstated its assets. 237 The defendant owned no stock in the
company, but he openly discussed the fraud with his clients and other
investors.2 38 The defendant also petitioned the Wall Street Journal,
unsuccessfully, to publish a story exposing the fraud. 39
The defendant was censured in the subsequent enforcement
proceeding for trading on material insider information in violation of
SEC Rule lOb-5. 240 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
defendant did not violate SEC Rule IOb-5 because his informants "were
motivated by a desire to expose the fraud.",24 ' The Court stated that the
absence of breach by the insiders (in exposing the fraud) compelled its
holding that there was no derivative breach by the defendant. 42 The
Court's holding protects whistleblowers, and there is no reason directors
who expose corporate fraud or malfeasance should not be similarly
protected. To protect directors in these situations, leaks motivated by an
intent to expose fraud or other corporate misconduct should be considered
acts in good faith.

235. See Kirk 0. Hanson & Jerry Ceppos, The Ethics of Leaking, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006,
at B13, available at 2006 WLNR 17304796 (balancing the ethical considerations of leaks and
concluding that some leaks "can be more easily ethically justified").
236. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
237. Id. at 649. The Court asserted that the fraud at Equity Funding of America was "one of
the most infamous frauds in recent memory" and that "the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to
investigate" the fraud. Id. at 652 n.8.
238. Id. at 649. Five investment advisers liquidated more than $16 million in Equity Funding
securities after hearing about the fraud from the defendant. Id.
239. Id. at 649-50.
240. Id. at 650-52. "Recognizing... that Dirks 'played an important role in bringing [Equity
Funding's] massive fraud to light,' the SEC only censured him." Id. at 651-52 (quoting Dirks,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1412 (1981) (footnotes omitted)).
241. Id. at 665-67.
242. Id.
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As described above, the benefits of recognizing a good faith duty of
confidentiality outweigh the costs. A duty of confidentiality would
increase collegiality on the board and provide a strong disincentive to a
director wishing to manipulate boardroom actions through leaks to the
press. A general duty of confidentiality would also give directors a bright
line rule to follow: If you misappropriate confidential corporate
information by leaking to outsiders, you could incur liability for failing to
act in good faith. Your liability will not be covered by director
indemnification or liability limitation provisions, so you may be forced to
pay damages out of your own pocket.
VI. CONCLUSION

The leak scandal at H-P highlights a key problem in corporate
governance: Directors do not currently owe a general duty of
confidentiality.243 However, the increasingly important duty of good faith
provides a perfect vehicle for recognizing such a duty. Leaks are
manipulative acts that damage a corporation's competitive position, hurt
investor relations, and expose the company and the director to liability for
violating federal securities laws. Directors should owe a duty of
confidentiality to prevent unilateral director action, promote collegiality
in boardrooms, and align the duties of directors with the fiduciary duties
of lawyers and other agents.
Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Regulation Fair
Disclosure, the federal government is assuming more regulatory control
over corporate governance. 244 Indeed, Regulation Fair Disclosure

243. The leak problem may continue to worsen. A recent Wall Street Journalarticle outlines
an increasingly common practice of institutional investors whereby these investors pay a network
of informants for information about companies of interest. See Laurie P. Cohen, Seeking an Edge,
Big Investors Turn to Network ofInformants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006, at A 1, availableat 2006
WLNR 20539724.
"Sophisticated investors are potentially taking advantage of people who don't
know they're going over the line" by disclosing nonpublic data such as internal
sales figures, asserts Jill Fisch, director of the Fordhan Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law. "Once someone is being paid, it's hard for them to
draw the line and say 'no."'
Id.
244. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 405 ("Sarbanes-Oxley not only federalizes corporate
fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them."); James Fanto, PaternalisticRegulation of
Public Company Management: Lessonsfrom Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REv. 859, 860 (2006)
("By all accounts, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002... represented a significant intrusion by the
federal government into the substantive regulation of corporate governance of U.S. public
companies, an area long considered to be the province of state corporate law.").
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represents a direct attempt by the SEC to silence some corporate leakers.24 5
If Delaware and other states wish to retain control over corporate
governance, the states must continue to adjust corporate governance
structures to changing corporate social norms. Delaware has responded to
this imperative by providing plaintiffs guidance on how to respond when
a director fails to act in good faith.246 But it is time for Delaware courts to
recognize that a director who leaks confidential corporate information
cannot be acting in good faith. If state courts miss this opportunity,
Delaware and other states will continue to cede control of corporate
governance to the federal government.247

245. See supranote 156.
246. See Marc Gunther, BoardsBeware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 171, availableat2003
WLNR 13892104 ('It would not be unreasonable to assume that the Delaware courts are
responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal
government into the internal governance of corporations."' (quoting former Chancellor William
Allen)).
247. For a proposal suggesting full-time federal corporate monitors for large companies
similar to current banking regulation arrangements, see generally Fanto, supra note 244.
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